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Abstract
By introducing money and foreign exchanges in the Zou (1997) model of mercantilism,
the paper shows the e¤ects of macroeconomic policies in mercantilist economies. It is shown
that in the long run, consumption and foreign asset accumulation increases as a result of
stronger mercantilist sentiments, permanent increases in the consumption tax, increases in
the monetary growth rate and purchases of foreign bonds. In the short run, however, macro-
economic disturbances including the mercantilist sentiments, the monetary growth rate, and
the consumption tax have negative e¤ects on current consumption and positive e¤ects on
current foreign asset accumulation, while purchasing foreign bonds has positive e¤ects on
both current consumption and current foreign asset accumulation. The theoretical explo-
rations may provide a theoretical structure for hoarding international reserves and export-led
growth strategy utilized by emerging market economies.
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1 Introduction
The 1997-1998 crisis in East Asia led to profound changes in the demand for international re-
serves, increasing over time the hoarding by a¤ected countries. Ever since the 2007 Global
Financial Crisis, more and more criticism concentrates on international reserves hoarding driven
by export-led development strategy and even some researchers relate this kind of reserves ac-
cumulation promoted by emerging economies to mercantilism.1 Even though these works are
empirical researches, they suggest us to reexamine the economic theory of mercantilism more
deeply.
Although mercantilism has been examined, criticized, or even ridiculed ever since Smith
(1776), some formal models of mercantilism have been developed. In a framework of the strate-
gic trade theory, Irwin (1991) develops a model of mercantilism and proves that it is protable
for a country to utilize export subsidies. The denition of mercantilism in his paper refers to
trade protection policies. Zou (1997) o¤ers a dynamic model of mercantilism according to the in-
terpretations by Viner (1948, 1968), Schmoller (1897), Cunningham (1907, 1968) and Heckscher
(1935) and shows that a permanent increase in the mercantilist sentiments or import tari¤s
leads to more foreign asset holdings and more total consumption in the long run. Although
within di¤erent frameworks, the positive e¤ect of import tari¤s in the Zou (1997) dynamic
model corresponds to the positive e¤ect of export subsidies in the Irwin (1991) static model.
Later, Mcdermott (1999) and Congleton and Lee (2009) investigate mercantilism in the pub-
lic nance perspective. Mcdermott (1999) argues that by establishing monopolies and taxing
households through those monopolies, modern government is likely to close the economy to new
ideas, technologies and business organizations and hence does harm to economic growth. By tak-
ing revenue-maximizing monopoly policies and industry regulations as dening characteristics,
Congleton and Lee (2009) examines the advantages (i.e., patent protection and innovation) and
disadvantages (i.e., corruption) of mercantilism. However, until now neither of these modeling
strategies dominates the theoretical literature on mercantilism.
Recently, many empirical researches relate the high level of reserves hoarding and global
imbalance to the outward mercantilism by emerging market economies. These articles (Doo-
ley et al. (2003), Jeanne and Ranciere (2005), Aizenman and Lee (2007, 2008), Blanchard and
Milesi-Ferretti (2009)) roughly argue that international reserves hoarding might be a by-product
of export-led growth strategy2, and reserves accumulation may further facilitate export growth
1See Dooley et al. (2003), Jeanne and Ranciere (2005), Aizenman and Lee (2007, 2008), Blanchard and
Milesi-Ferretti (2009), Aizenman, Jinjarak and Zheng (2015).
2By comparing the relative importance of precautionary and mercantilist motives in the hoarding of interna-
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by preventing or slowing appreciation. The dening characteristics of mercantilism in these
researches are international reserves hoarding and the associated export-led growth strategy.
Moreover, Aizenman, Jinjarak and Zheng (2015) argues that after global nancial crisis, in-
stead of hoarding low-yielding assets (mostly international reserves), the new chapter of Chinese
outward-mercantilism aims at securing a higher rate of returns on its net foreign asset posi-
tion (i.e., outward-oriented FDI in natural resources, commordities and mining) and providing
a wide spectrum of infrastructure and construction services to developing countries. However,
these empirical works do not provide any theoretical structures for mercantilism.
Hence, the paper extends the Zou (1997) model of mercantilism by introducing money and
foreign exchanges in a framework of the modern theory of international nance, and reexamines
the desirability and e¤ectiveness of macroeconomic policies in mercantilist economies. In our
opinion, only trade protection policies or public nance viewpoints or even the empirical boarding
of international reserves can not embody the complete picture of mercantilism. Extending Zou
(1997)s modeling strategy is based on the following considerations: (1) the open economy
framework conrms with both the historical background of the emergence of mercantlilism and
the current export-led growth strategy utilized by emerging market economies; (2) the utility
structure including both consumption and foreign assets conrms with encyclopaedic accounts
by many economists3; (3) only in the open economy structure developed by Zou (1997) can we
easily introduce money and foreign exchanges and try to provide a theoretical explanation for
those empirical works. About this, we want to provide (at least partially) a theoretical framework
which can show how purchasing international reserves accelerates depreciation of the exchange
rate and hence facilitates export growth; and furthermore, (4) the mercantilist economy that Zou
(1997) had examined is a real economy. Based on Heckscher (1935)s argument mercantilism
as a system of money, we think that extending the Zou (1997) real economy to a monetary
economy will help us to explore more insightful policy implications of mercantilism.4
We organize the study as follows. In section 2, we outline the structure of the model and
examine their basic dynamics. We dene the utility funcition of a representative nation on
both consumption and foreign asset accumulation to capture power vs plentyas objectives of
mercantilism (Viner, 1948, 1968), but also on money to capture mercantilism as a system of
moneyargued by Heckscher (1935). In section 3, we rst look at how the mercantlilist mentality
tional reserves by developing countries, Aizenman and Lee (2007) shows empirically that precautionary motives
dominate.
3See Viner (1948, 1968), Schmoller (1897), Cunningham (1907, 1968) and Heckscher (1935).
4Zou (1997) also tells that it should also be an interesting open question to study scal policy, monetary policy
and the exchange-rate theory in the Zou model of mercantilism.
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a¤ects long-run consumption, real money balances and foreign asset accumulation and show that
a nation with stronger mercantilist sentiments will have higher long-run consumption and foreign
asset holdings. And higher rate of monetary growth leads to more consumption and foreign
asset accumulation. Furthermore, consumption tax leads to higher levels of consumption, real
money balances and foreign asset holdings, just as what Viner (1948, 1968) had said that in
order to maximize long-term standard of living mercantilist will surpress the current standard
of living. Finally, purchasing foreign bonds from the private sector improves long-run levels
of consumption, real money balance holdings and foreign asset accumulation. This point may
provide a theoretical structure for hoarding international reserves and export-led growth strategy
utilized by emerging economies. In section 4, we utilize a technique developed by Judd (1982)
and Cui and Gong (2006) to analyze the e¤ects of various exogenous shocks on consumption, real
balances and foreign asset accumulation at the initial equilibrium. In section 5, we summarize
the main ndings and point out directions for future research.
2 The Zou Model of Mercantilism with Money and Foreign Ex-
changes
We consider a small open economy in a competitive world market, which is populated with many
identical agents. Combining Zou (1997)s modeling strategy for mercantilism and Heckschers
idea mercantilism as a system of money, we dene the instantaneous utility function of a
representative agent as
U(ct;mt; bt) = u(ct;mt) + w(bt);
where ct is per capita consumption, mt is per capita real money balances, bt is per capita
foreign bonds, and (> 0) measures the mercantilist sentiments in the words of Cunningham
(1907) or the mercantilist mentality in the viewpoint of Heckscher (1935). It is assumed that the
function u(c;m) is an increasing and concave function of its two arguments, satisfying Edgeworth
complementarity (i.e., ucm > 0)5, and w(b) is an increasing and concave function of foreign asset
holdings. In the spirits of Viner (1948, 1968), the utility part u(c;m) can be understood as the
utility from plenty (or opulence), whereas the part w(b) can be regarded as the power that
5Here money enters the economy by one standard way of money in the utility function( MIU) forwarded by
Sidrauski (1967). The other way that money enters is through the cash-in-advance(CIA) constraint pioneered
by Lucas and Stokey (1987). Feenstra (1986) shows that the two ways introducing money in the economy are
equivalent under some conditions.
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people (or a nation) possess and enjoy.6
The optimization problem of the representative agent with an innite horizon is to maximize
Z 1
0
[u(ct;mt) + w(bt)]e
 tdt;
subject to the budget and stock constraints

at = y + rbt + xt   (1 + )ct   tmt; (1)
at = bt +mt; (2)
and the initial condition b(0) = b0: Thereinto, y is the exogenously given real output, xt is
the real transfers from government, at is the total wealth of the representative agent including
foreign bonds bt and real money balancesmt, r is the returns on foreign bonds, t is the expected
ination rate, and  is the tax on consumption.
The home price of the consumption good is Pt, and the corresponding world price is P t :
Assuming purchasing power parity, we have Pt = EtP t , where Et is the exchange rate. With
proper normalization, P t can be set to one. Then, Pt = Et.
The Hamiltonian is dened as follows
H = u(c;m) + w(b) + [y + rb+ x  (1 + )c  m] + (a  b m);
where  and  are the Hamilton and Lagrange multipliers of the two constraints, respectively.
The necessary conditions for optimization are as follows:
uc(c;m) = (1 + ); (3)
um(c;m) =  + ; (4)
w0(b) =   r; (5)
 =  

; (6)
lim
t!1e
 tb = lim
t!1e
 tm = 0:
6 In its abstract form, the mercantilist utility function is similar to the wealth e¤ectmodel as Kurz (1968),
the spirit of capitalismmodels as Zou (1994), Baskin and Chen (1996), and Luo, Smith and Zou (2009), and
the social statusmodel as Luo and Yong (2009). For more mercantilist arguments, Zou (1997) summerizes the
viewpoints of Cunningham (1907), Heckscher (1935), and Viner (1948, 1968).
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Equation (3) shows that the marginal utility of consumption equals the shadow price of the total
wealth per capita. From equations (3), (4) and (5), we have
w0(b) = um(c;m)  r + 
(1 + )
uc(c;m); (7)
which tells that the marginal benets of holding foreign assets, i.e., w0(b), is equal to the net
marginal benets of holding money, i.e., um(c;m)  ((r + ) =(1 + ))uc(c;m).7 Equation (6) is
the modied Keynes-Ramsey condition: the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
at two points in time equal the rate of substitution plus the marginal rate of substitutution of
consumption and foreign assets. Combining equations (3), (5) and (6) yields
ucc(c;m)

c+ ucm(c;m)

m = (  r)uc(c;m)  (1 + )w0(b); (8)
which describes explicitly the growth rate of the marginal utility of consmption (notice that

(uc) = ucc(c;m)

c+ ucm(c;m)

m) as a linear rst order di¤erential equation with a forcing term
(i.e., [ (1 + )w0(b)=uc]), and is also the intertemporal consumption Euler equation.
To fully spell out the dynamics of the mercantilist economy, we need to specify the behavior of
government. Governments revenues come from the ination tax, consumption tax, and interest
earnings from central banks foreign reserves, i.e.,

M=P + c + rR; where M denotes nominal
money stock and R denotes the amount of foreign reserves. Government consumes goods, g,
and makes transfers, x, to the representative agent. Hence, the budget constraint of government
is given by
g + x =

M
P
+ c+ rR: (9)
Let the monetary growth rate be a positive real number  (> 0), namely,

M
M
= : (10)
With the help of equation (10) and the denition of real balances (i.e., m = M=P ), equation (9)
turns out to
x = m+ c+ rR  g: (11)
7Equation (7) can be rewritten as: um=uc = (r + ) = (1 + )+ (w0 (b)) = (uc), which shows that the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and real money balances is equal to the sum of two terms: one is
the modied (by the consumption tax) norminal interest rate, the other is the marginal rate of substitution of
consumption and foreign bonds.
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Following Obstfeld (1981, 1982), we examine the perfect foresight equilibrium path of the
mercantilist economy, where the expected and actual ination rates coincide, and simultaneously,
the expected and actual growth rates of the nominal exchange rate also coincide. Since Pt = Et
holds, we know that

P
P
=

E
E
= e = : (12)
Therefore,

m =
0@ M
M
 

P
P
1Am = (   )m: (13)
For (7), we have  = (1+)[um(c;m) w
0(b)]
uc(c;m)
  r. Substituting it into (13) leads to

m =
m[(r + )uc(c;m) + (1 + )(w
0(b)  um(c;m))]
uc(c;m)
: (14)
Subtituting (14) into (8), and (2), (11) and (13) into (1) result in

c =   1
ucc

(1 + )w0(b) + (r   )uc(c;m) + mumc
uc

(r + )uc + (1 + )(w
0(b)  um)

;
(15)

b = y + rb+ rR  c  g: (16)
Equation (15) is the consumption Euler equation, which is the same equation as (8). Equation
(14) gives us the optimal growth rate of real money balance holdings under the rule of optimal
portfolio. And equation (16) is the dynamic accumulation equation of foreign assets. Altogether,
equations (14)-(16) describe the whole dynamics of the mercantilist economy.
For the innite-horizon autonomous system, the economy approaches the steady state in the
long run. Because of the nonlinearity of the dynamic system, we need to examine the existence,
uniqueness, and stability of the steady state of the economy. Dene the steady state (c;m; b)
by setting

c =

m =

b = 0. We can obtain the following three algebraic equations:
(1 + )w0(b) + (r   )uc(c;m) = 0; (17)
(r + )uc(c
;m) + (1 + )[w0(b)  um(c;m)] = 0; (18)
y + rb + rR  c   g = 0; (19)
6
which pin down the steady state of the economy. Equation (17) can be rewritten as (1+)w
0(b)
uc(c;m) =
 r, which shows that the marginal rate of substitution of consumption and foreign bonds equals
to a positive constant,   r, and simultaneously tells that the time preference rate of the agent
must be larger than the real interest rate in the economy. Equation (18) is the equilibrium
version of the optimality condition (7) with  =  at equilibrium. It is proved in the appendix
6.1 that a su¢ cient condition for the existence, uniqueness, and saddle-point stability of the
steady state is:
 w00(b)n
(uccumm u2cm)
[(+)ucm (1+)umm]
o > r(  r): (20)
Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 In the Zou model of Mercantilism with money and foreign exchanges, if (20)
holds, then the steady state exists uniquely and saddle-point stable.8
3 Long-run Policy Analysis
The following two sections study the long-run and short run e¤ects of an increase of the mercan-
tilist sentiments, an increase in the rate of monetary expansion, an increase in real government
consumption, an increase of the consumption tax and the intervention in the foreign exchange
market. The macroeconomic disturbances are assumed to take the public by surprise, but they
are permanent and lead to no expectation of future policy actions. The economys initial posi-
tion is the steady state. To execute the long-run analysis, we take total di¤erentials on equations
(17), (18) and (19) as follows:0BB@
(r   )ucc (r   )ucm (1 + )w00(b)
B21 B22 (1 + )w
00(b)
 1 0 r
1CCA
0BB@
dc
dm
db
1CCA =
0BB@
B1
B2
dg   rdR
1CCA ; (21)
where B21 = (r+ )ucc   (1 + )umc, B22 = (r+ )ucm   (1 + )umm, B1 =  (1 + )w0(b)d  
w0(b)d , and B2 =  ucd   (1 + )w0(b)d + (um   w0(b))d .
3.1 The E¤ect of the Mercantilist Mentality
8Roughly speaking, the left-hand side of (20) stands for the relative concavity of the utility parts of w(b)
and u(c;m), and (20) tells that in order for the saddle-point stability of the steady state, the relative concavity
of these two utility parts cannot be too small, with a positive lower bound, r(  r). Moreover, equation (20) is
similar to equation (12) of Zou (1997).
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To examine the long-run e¤ect of a permanent increase of the mercantilist mentality, we should
set d = dg = dR = d = 0 in (21). Then, by Cramers Rule, we obtain
dc
d
=
(1 + )rw0(b)[(1 + )umm   (+ )ucm]

> 0;
dm
d
=
(1 + )rw0(b)[(+ )ucc   (1 + )umc]

> 0;
db
d
=
 (1 + )w0(b)[(+ )ucm   (1 + )umm]

> 0;
where  =  uccucm det(J) < 0 holds for (20).
Proposition 3.1 A permanent increase of the mercantilist sentiments will increase the long-run
consumption, real money balances, and foreign asset holdings.
With higher mercantilist sentiments, the agent attaches more importance to her wealth
on foreign assets, she saves more (i.e., consumes less) and accumulates more foreigh assets
in the short run.9 Therefore, the long-run level of foreign assets will be higher. However,
the relative degrees of these two opposite e¤ects are di¤erent in the short run and long run.
In the short run, the wealth e¤ects are relatively weak and the net e¤ect on consumption is
negative. But in the long run, the positive wealth e¤ect dominates the negative preference
e¤ect on consumption, which leads to more steady state consumption. Since more money must
be delivered by consumers for more consumption, the steady state level of real money balance
holdings is also raised.
3.2 The E¤ect of the Monetary Growth Rate
Likewise, setting d = dg = dR = d = 0 in (21) and applying Cramers Rule lead to
dc
d
=
r(r   )ucucm

> 0;
db
d
=
(r   )ucucm

> 0;
dm
d
=
uc[r(  r)ucc   (1 + )w00(b)]

:
Proposition 3.2 A permanent increase of the monetary growth rate increases the long-run con-
sumption and foreign asset accumulation; however, the e¤ect on the long-run real balances
is ambiguous.
The long-run positive e¤ect on foreign asset accumulation of an increase of the monetary
growth rate has two channels: portfolio substitution e¤ect and currency depreciation e¤ect. An
9The short-run e¤ect of an increase of the mercantilist sentiments will be veried in section 4.1.
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increase of the monetary growth rate raises the ination rate and hence the opportunity cost of
holding money. Thus, consumers will economize real money balances and buy foreign assets in
the short run. Meanwhile, equation (12) tells that the exchange rate equals the ination rate
at each instant, also in the steady state (i.e., e =  = ). Higher equilibrium exchange rate
means currency depreciation, which implies that net exports are easier, so is the accumulation of
foreign assets. Both channels induce the agent to reduce real balances and increase their holdings
of foreign assets. However, an increase of the monetary growth rate has two opposite e¤ects on
consumption. On one hand, the increased foreign assets caused by both portfolio substitution
e¤ect and currency depreciation e¤ect will bring about more interest earnings and hence a higher
level of consumption. On the other hand, higher ination erodes the total wealth of the private
sector. This negative income e¤ect enforces consumers to decrease consumption. Furthermore,
with less money balance holdings, consumers consume less due to ucm > 0. Altogether, the
positive e¤ect of an increase of the monetary growth rate dominates and hence the net e¤ect on
consumption is positive.,
In the long run, the level of foreign assets and hence consumption will be higher. For real
balance holdings, there also exist two opposite e¤ects (i.e., the negative e¤ect of the increased
opportunity cost and the positive e¤ect of the increased long-run consumption) and the net
e¤ects are ambiguous.10
3.3 The E¤ect of Government Consumption
Similar to the standard Ramsey model, if government consumption is wasterful, it will crowd
out the private consumption. Setting d = d = dR = d = 0 in (21) and applying Cramers
Rule give rise to
dc
dg
=
w00(b)[umm   (+ )ucm]

< 0;
dm
dg
=
w00(b)[(+ )ucc   ucm]

< 0;
db
dg
=
(  r)[uccumm   u2cm]

< 0:
10 If the utility is additively separable between consumption and real balance holdings (namely, u(c;m) =
u(c) + v(m); which implies ucm = 0), then di¤erent forces enfored on the economy might cancel each other out.
Then, expansionary monetary policies have no long-run e¤ect on the economy, that is, money is superneutrality
in the sense of Sidrauski (1967).
9
These conclusions are di¤erent from Obstfeld (1981), which argues that the government expendi-
ture has no e¤ects on the private consumption and positive e¤ects on foreign asset accumulation.
In our model, government consumption reduces the wealth transfers from government to the pri-
vate sector and hence decreases the disposable income of consumers. With less income, they
must consume less and accumulate less. Furthermore, the negative e¤ect is so high that it can
dominate the utility e¤ect of government consumption.11
Proposition 3.3 A permanent increase of government consumption, whether or not into the
private utility, always reduces the long run levels of consumption, real money balances and
foreign asset holdings.
3.4 The E¤ect of the Consumption Tax
Generally, taxes mean higher prices. The imposition of the consumption tax is likely to decrease
the levels of consumption and welfare. But, the converse conclusions are drawn in our model.
The e¤ect of the consumption tax can be seen by applying Cramers rule to equation (21)
dc
d
=
r(1 + )ummw
0(b)

> 0;
dm
d
=
r(  r)uccw0(b) + (1 + )[umw00(b)  rumcw0(b)]

> 0;
db
d
=
(1 + )ummw
0(b)

> 0:
Proposition 3.4 A permanent increase in the consumption tax raises consumption, real money
balances and foreign asset accumulation in the long run.
With a higher price on the consumption good, people consume less and invest more on the
foreign assets currently. Gradually, they will accumulate more and more foreign assets. In the
long run, they will attain higher level of foreign assets and more interest payments. With higher
income, their long-run levels of consumption are also increased. Hence, in the nations with
mercantilism, consumption tax is an e¤ective way to suppress current consumption, stimulate
savings and investment, and hence increase their wealth and power of the nations in the long run.
Just as Viner (1948, 1968) had explained that mercantilist appears to be maximizing a countrys
11That is, even if government expenditures enter the utility function (i.e., government expenditures result in
the provision of some public goods), the e¤ect of an increase of the government consumption is also negative.
That is to say, even if the utility function is U(c; g;m; b) = u(c; g) + v(m) + w(b) with ug > 0 and ucg > 0, the
e¤ect is still negative.
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power through accumulation of foreign assets and maximizing the long-term standard of living
by surpressing the current standard of living. Meanwhile, similar to Zou (1997), proposition
(3.4) provides support for the mercantilist policy of protection, namely, the fear of goods
(Heckscher, 1935), if attainment of higher long-run consumption is the objective of a nation.
Both Proposition 3.1 and 3.4 indicate the long-run harmony between wealth and power. Indeed,
from the mercantilist perspective, there is long-run harmony between these two ends, although
in particular circumstances it may be necessary for a time to make economic sacrices in the
interest of ...long-run prosperity(Viner, 1968). Following an increase in the consumption tax,
the short-run consumption will be cut because people invest more in foreign assets. But in the
long run, the increased foreign asset accumulation gives rise to more consumption and more
power for the nation.
3.5 The E¤ect of Purchasing Foreign Bonds
Another interesting comparisons between Obstfeld (1981)s model and ours are the di¤erent
e¤ects of the central banks purchasing of foreign currency. In Obstfelds model, if the central
bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market by purchasing foreign bonds from the public
with domestic currency, the total real assets in the economy are not a¤ected, and, as the central
banks reserves also earn real income and wealth remains the same. Therefore, the central
banks intervention does not have real e¤ects on foreign asset accumulation, consumption and
real money balance holdings. It only occasions a rise in the price level exactly proportional to
an increase in money supply. However, since foreigh bonds are directly valued in the utility in
our model, the symmetry of foreign bonds and foreign reserves in Obstfelds model disappears.
Shortly after the purchase of the central bank, the reduction of foreign bonds held by the private
sector results in higher marginal utility of foreign assets, hence the optimality condition (7) and
the equilibrium condition (18) no longer hold. When the initial equilibrium foreign assets are
reduced by dR and real balances are increased by dR, (7) and (18) become
w0(b  dR) + (r + )uc(c;m+ dR)  um(c;m+ dR) > 0;
w0(b   dR) + (r + )uc(c;m + dR)  um(c;m + dR) > 0:
To restore equilibrium, the agent will increase consumption and buy more foreign bonds in the
short run.12 And at the new equilibrium, private consumption, real money balances, and foreign
12The short-run postive e¤ects on foreign asset accumulation of purchasing foreign bonds can be checked in
section 4.5.
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asset holdings will reach higher levels. By utilizing Cramers Rule in (21), we obtain
dc
dR
=
rw00(b)[(+ )ucm   umm]

> 0;
dm
dR
=
rw00(b)[umc   (+ )ucc]

> 0;
db
dR
=
r(  r)[uccumm   u2cm]

> 0:
Proposition 3.5 The central banks purchase of foreign claims from the public with domestic
currency will lead to more foreign asset accumulation (the sum of central banks reserve
and private holdings), more consumption and more real money balances in the long run.
The above result has another logic which establishes that purchasing foreign bonds from the
private sector as an e¤ective method of pretection utilized by the mercantilists. That is, in order
to purchase more foreign assets and hence hoard international reserves (i.e., R increases), the
central bank must pay domestic currency (i.e.,  increases). Probably the central bank releases
money into the economy. With more money in the economy, domestic currency will depreciate
(i.e.,  (= ) increases) and the exchange rate will be higher (i.e., e (=  = ) increases).
Then, net exports will be much easier and so is the accumulation of foreign assets. That is, on
one hand, if emerging economies accumulate more foreign assets, the central bank can hoard
more international reserves. On the other hand, if the central bank buys foreign exchanges and
hoards more international reserves, it must release more domestic currency into the economy.
Then the exchange rate will depreciate and hence export will be easier. Hence, we may provide a
theoretical structure for those empirical works that cited in the introduction, in which hoarding
international reserves and export-led growth strategy functions e¤ectively in emerging market
economies.
4 Short-run Policy Analysis
The short-run e¤ects of macroeconomic policies will be examined in this section. It is assumed
that at t = 0 the economy is in the steady state (c;m; b) and these policy parameters follow
the following rule of changes:
x0 = x+ "hi(t); i = ; ; g; ; R; (22)
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where " is a scalar parameter, initially equal to zero, and functions fhi(t), i = ; ; g; ; Rg are
bounded and eventually constant. For simplicity, we take the separable log utility: U(c;m; b) =
ln c+ lnm+ ln b. By utilizing the method of Laplace transform developed by Judd (1982) and
Cui and Gong (2006), we can derive the dynamic system for short-run analysis:13
c"(0) = (r   3) [HR(2) Hg(2)]  (  r)
2 (y + rR  g)
 (1 + ) [  r (1 +  (1 + ))] [(1 + )H(2) + H (2)] ;
(23)
m"(0) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 !2 !32 3 (r   3) [rHR(2) Hg(2)] + !2 !32 3
( r)2(y+rR g)
(1+)[ r(1+(1+))]
f(1 + ) [H(2) H(+ )] +  [H (2) H (+ )]g
  ( r)(1+)(y+rR g)(+)[ r(1+(1+))]H(+ )  ( r)(r+)(y+rR g)[ r(1+(1+))] H (+ )+
( r)2(1+)(y+rR g)
(+)[ r(1+(1+))]H(+ )  !3(r 2) !2(r 3)2 3 [rHR(+ ) Hg(+ )]
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
;
(24)

b"(0) =  c"(0) + rhR(0)  hg(0): (25)
To examine the short-run e¤ects of permanent policy shocks, we dene the permanent positive
changes in macroeconomic policies by
hi(t) = 1, i = ,,g, ,R, and t > 0.
The Laplace transform of hi(t) with the parameter j , j = 1; 2 is as follows:
Hi(j) =
1
j
:
Equipped with these denitions, equations (23)-(25) provide the short-run e¤ects of all sorts of
permanent changes of macroeconomic policies.
4.1 The E¤ect of the Mercantilist Sentiments
Let i =  in equations (23)-(25). We have
13The derivation details can be found in appendix 6.2.
13
c"(0) =   (  r)
2 (y + rR  g)
2[  r (1 +  (1 + ))] < 0;
m"(0) =
(  r)2 (y + rR  g) [2 (  r) (  r (1 +  (1 + ))) = + (+ ) (1 + ) (2   )]
2 (+ )
2 [(+ )  3] [  r (1 +  (1 + ))]
;

b"(0) =  c"(0) > 0:
Proposition 4.1 A permanent increase in the mercantilist mentality decreases current con-
sumption, increases current foreign asset accumulation, but its e¤ect on current real bal-
ance holdings is ambiguous.
The negative e¤ects on current consumption and positive e¤ects on current asset holdings
have been pointed out in section 3.1. A permanent increase of the mercantilist sentiments tells
that people prefer more foreign assets. People will increase their holdings of foreign assets.
As is pointed out, there are two opposite e¤ects on consumption: a negative e¤ect due to the
preference shock and a positive e¤ect because of the wealth e¤ects. In the short run, the negative
e¤ect on consumption dominates the wealth e¤ect for the increased interest payments, and hence
current consumption decreases. Furthermore, since the wealth e¤ect on current consumption is
so small that less money is needed for purchase in the short run than in the long run. Then, the
short run e¤ects on current real balance holdings are ambiguous.
Combining Proposition 3.1 with 4.1, a permanent increase in the mercantilist sentiments
brings out more foreign asset accumulation both in the short run and long run; however, their
e¤ects on consumption are di¤erent: current consumption decreases and long-run consumption
increases. This divergence may explain why Smiths criticism on mercantiliststotal disregard
of consumption is unfair since Smith missed an important fact: just like what the theory has
predicted, the mercantlist country only misses out on consumption for a while and the victim
country only gets increased consumption for a while. Eventually the growth of industry and
income in the mercantlist country and the loss of industry and income in the victim country
reverses the tide.14
14 It is well known that Adam Smith rejected the mercantilist focus on production, arguing that consumption
was the only way to grow an economy. In his 1776 book, Wealth of Nations, Smith rst laid out the theory
that mercantilism hurts the economy of the country practicing it because it hurts consumers in order to benet
producers. He correctly wrote:consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the
producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The
maxim is so perfectly self-evident that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it. But in the mercantile system
the interest of the consumer is almost constantly sacriced to that of the producer; and it seems to consider
production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all industry and commerce. (iv.8.49)
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4.2 The E¤ect of the Monetary Growth Rate
Setting i =  in equations (23)-(25) gives us
c"(0) =

b"(0) = 0; m"(0) =   (  r) (1 + ) (y + rR  g)
(+ )2 [  r (1 +  (1 + ))] < 0:
Proposition 4.2 An increase of the monetary growth rate just reduces the demand for real
money balances, and has no e¤ect on the current consumption and foreign asset accumu-
lation.
The neutrality of money in the short run corresponds to the superneutrality result in the long
run with the separable utility case, since we has chosen a separable utility case in this section.
Here we have also drawn an interesting conclusion that in the Viner-Zou monetary model with
separable utility, monetary policies have no real e¤ects on the economy in the short run and long
run. Similar to the analysis in section 3.2, the positive wealth e¤ect for the increased foreign
assets and the negative e¤ect of the ination taxexactly cancel each other out. Hence, the net
short-run e¤ects on the economy of expansionary monetary policies are zero. However, if the
utility between consumption and real money balances is nonseparable, the result must be as
follows: current consumption decreases and current asset accumulation increases, which have
been conjectured in section 3.2. Encountering the increased monetary growth rate, the agent
with perfect foresight will expect that the equilibrium ination rate will be higher and domestic
currency will also depreciate. Hence, she will reduce her current holdings of real money balances
and hence current consumption and buy more foreign bonds.
4.3 The E¤ect of Government Consumption
Substituting i = g in equations (23)-(25) leads to
c"(0) =  r   3
2
< 0; m"(0) =  (!2   !3) (r   3)
2 (2   3) +
!3(r   2)  !2(r   3)
(+ ) (2   3) ;

b"(0) =    r
2
< 0:
Proposition 4.3 A permanent increase of government consumption decreases current con-
sumption and foreign asset accumulation, and its e¤ect on current real money balances
is ambiguous.
Except for the ambiguous e¤ect on real money balances, government consumption crowds out
current private consumption and foreign asset accumulation. Since more government consump-
tion means the reduction of the agents disposable income, a permanent increase of government
consumption decreases consumption and foreign asset accumulation all the time, just as Propo-
sition 3.3 and Proposition 4.3 have shown.
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4.4 The E¤ect of the Consumption Tax
Setting i =  in equations (23)-(25) gives rise to
c"(0) =   (  r)
2 (y + rR  g)
2 (1 + ) [  r (1 +  (1 + ))] < 0;
m"(0) =
(!2   !3) (  r)2 (y + rR  g) [(+ )  2]
2 (2   3) (+ ) (1 + ) [  r (1 +  (1 + ))]  
(  r)2 (r + ) (y + rR  g)
(+ ) [  r (1 +  (1 + ))] ;

b"(0) =  c"(0) > 0:
Proposition 4.4 A permanent increase in the consumption tax decreases current consumption,
increases current asset accumulation, and its e¤ect on current real balances is ambiguous.
Higher consumption tax means higher price on consumption, and consumers will consume
less in the short run. Since the current income of consumers keeps constant, consumers will raise
their holdings of foreign assets. As a mercantilist policy, the sole shortcoming of the consumption
tax is its negative e¤ect on current consumption. In the long run, it does not matter, especially
for small developing countries. Therefore, much criticism on mercantilism may be unfair.
4.5 The E¤ect of Purchasing Forign Bonds
Setting i = R in equations (23)-(25) gives us
c"(0) =  r (r   3)
2
> 0; m"(0) =
r (r   2) (!2   !3)
2 (2   3)  
r [!3 (r   2)  !2 (r   3)]
(+ ) (2   3) ;

b"(0) =
r (  r)
2
> 0:
Proposition 4.5 The central banks purchase of foreign claims from the public with domestic
currency will increases current consumption and current asset accumulation, however, its
e¤ect on current real balances is ambiguous.
Once the foreign reserves held by the central bank are increased, their e¤ects on both con-
sumption and foreign asset accumulation are positive in the short run and long run. The logic
has been given in section 3.5. In order to hold more foreign bonds, the central bank must release
more domestic currency into the economy, which is equivalent to raise the monetary growth rate.
And the agent expects that ination will increase and the exchange rate will rise. Hence, both
portfolio substitution e¤ect and currency depreciation e¤ect will induce the agent to increase
consumption and foreign asset accumulation both in the short run and long run.
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long-run e¤ects short-run e¤ects
c m b c" (0) m" (0)

b" (0)
mercantilist sentiments () + + +   ambiguous +
monetary growth rate () + + ambiguous     +
government consumption (g)         ambiguous  
consumption tax () + + +   ambiguous +
purchasing foreign bonds (R) + + + + ambiguous +
Table 1: Long-run and short-run e¤ects of exogenous policy shocks. Note that "+" stands for
positive e¤ects and "-" stands for negative e¤ects.
5 Conclusion
This paper extends the Zou (1997) model of mercantilism by introducing money and foreign
exchanges, and reexamines the long-run and short-run e¤ects of macroeconomic disturbances.
It is shown that a nation with stronger mercantilist sentiments has higher consumption and
larger foreign asset accumulation in the long run; a permanent rise in the consumption tax
brings about more foreign asset holdings and more consumption in the long run; an increase
in the monetary growth rate and purchasing foreign bonds from the private sector increase
the long-run levels of consumption and foreign asset accumulation. In the short-run analysis,
macroeconomic policy shocks including the mercantilist sentiments, the monetary growth rate,
and the consumption tax, have negative e¤ects on current consumption and positive e¤ects on
current foreign asset accumulation, while purchasing foreign bonds has positive e¤ects on both
current consumption and foreign asset accumulation in the short run. The paper may provide
(at least partially) a theoretical framework for those empirical works on hoarding international
reserve and export-led growth strategy utilized by emerging market economies, since our model
displays how purchasing international reserves accelerates depreciation of the exchange rate and
facilitates export growth.
In future research, it may be very interesting to introduce portfolio choice and to study risk-
taking, global diversication, growth and welfare in partial equilibrium small open economies.
And quantitative analysis should be emphasized in this research line on mercantilism: calibrating
or estimating the mercantilist parameter, examining the quantitative implications of mercantilist
policies and making theoretical predictions in mercantilist economies. In another research line,
it may be desirable to construct general equilibrium models with mercantilism. We may combine
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mercantilism with two-country (or large open) models presented by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995,
2000) and derive the general equilibrium e¤ect of mercantilism.
6 Mathematical Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
In this appendix, we will prove that if (20) holds, the steady state exists uniquely and saddle-
point stable. From (19), we have b = c

r +
 g y
r  R
  cr + . Putting b into equations (17)
and (18) yields:
 (1 + )w0

c
r
+ 

+(r   )uc (c;m) = 0; (r+)uc(c;m)+(1+)[w0(c

r
+) um(c;m)] = 0:
Taking total di¤erentials on both equations yields:
dm
dc
=
[ (1 + )w00 (b) =r] + (r   )ucc
(  r) rumc
;
dm
dc
=
 (1 + ) [w00(b)=r   ucm]  (r + )ucc
(r + )umc   (1 + )umm
> 0:
If the slope of the rst curve is larger than the one of the second curve at each point (i.e., (20)
holds),15 then they cross only once in the space of (c;m). That is to say, if (20) holds, then
the steady state exists uniquely.
We will conrm that if (20) holds, then the steady state is saddle-point stable. We linearize
the dynamic equations (15), (14), and (16) around the steady state as follows:
0BB@

c

m

b
1CCA =
0BB@
 A11ucc  A12ucc  A13ucc
m[(r+)ucc (1+)umc]
uc
m[(r+)ucm (1+)umm]
uc
m[(1+)w00(b)]
uc
 1 0 r
1CCA
0BB@
c  c
m m
b  b
1CCA ;
where A11 = (r  )ucc + mumcuc [(r+ )ucc  (1 + )umc], A12 = (r  )ucm + m
umc
uc
[(r+ )ucm 
(1 + )umm], and A13 = (1 + )w00(b) + m
umc
uc
(1 + )w00(b).16 It is easy to know that the
sign of the trace of J is positive, namely,
trace(J) =   (1 + )m

ucucc
[uccumm   u2cm] > 0;
15Note that (20) holds if and only if [
(1+)w00(b)=r]+(r )ucc
( r)rumc >
 (1+)[w00(b)=r ucm] (r+)ucc
(r+)umc (1+)umm :
16Note that ehe partial derivatives in the Jacobian matrix J are evaluated at the steady state.
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which shows that there exists at least an eigenvalue with a positive real part. If (20) holds, then
the determinant of the J is negative, namely,
det(J) =  m
(1 + )
uccuc

r(  r) uccumm   u2cm+ w00(b) [(+ )ucm   (1 + )umm]	 < 0;
which implies that the Jacobian matrix has a negative real eigenvalue or three eigenvalues with
negative real parts. Combining them, we know that the Jacobian matrix has just one negative
eigenvalue. Since there is only one state variable in the system, the steady state is locally
saddle-point stable.
6.2 Deriving the Dynamic System for Short-Run Analysis
In this appendix, we derive the dynamic equations for short-run analysis. Substituting (22) and
the utility form into Eqs. (14)-(16) yields

c = c2

1
b
( + "h(t)) (1 +  + "h (t)) +
(r   )
c

;

m = cm

1
c
(r +  + "h(t)) + (1 +  + "h (t))

 + "h(t)
b
  1
m

;

b = y + r(b+R+ "hR(t))  c  (g + "hg(t)) ;
with boundary conditions jlimt!1 b(t)j <1, b(0) = b0. The steady state can be derived as
(c;m; b) =

(  r) (y + rR  g)
  r (1 +  (1 + )) ;
(  r) (1 + ) (y + rR  g)
(+ ) [  r (1 +  (1 + ))] ;
 (1 + ) (y + rR  g)
  r (1 +  (1 + ))

:
The positivity of consumption requires that the parameter values satisfy  r (1 +  (1 + )) > 0,
from which we conclude that b is positive (i.e., foreign assets).
The optimal solutions for c, m, and b depend on both t and ". Dene x"(t) = @x(t; 0)=@",

x"(t) = @[@x(t; 0)=@"]=@t, x = c;m; b. Di¤erentiating the above three equations w.r.t " and
evaluating them at " = 0 yield the following system:
0BB@

c"

m"

b"
1CCA =
0BB@
  r 0   ( r)2(1+)
  (r+)(1+)+ +    ( r)
2
(+)
 1 0 r
1CCA
0BB@
c"(t)
m"(t)
b"(t)
1CCA+
0BB@
u1(t)
u2(t)
u3(t)
1CCA ;
where
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u1(t) =
(  r)2 (y + rR  g)
 (1 + ) [  r (1 +  (1 + ))] ((1 + )h(t) + h (t)) ;
u2(t) =
(  r) (y + rR  g)
(+ ) [  r (1 +  (1 + ))]

(1 + )h(t)  (r + )h (t) + 1

(1 + ) (  r)h(t)

;
u3(t) = rhR(t)  hg(t):
Denote the Laplace transforms by the upper case letters of the associated variables being in
lower case. Taking the Laplace transform with parameter s in the matrix system leads to
(sI   J)
0BB@
C"(s)
M"(s)
B"(s)
1CCA =
0BB@
U1(s) + c"(0)
U2(s) +m"(0)
U3(s)
1CCA ;
where U1(s) =
( r)2(y+rR g)
(1+)[ r(1+(1+))] [(1 + )H(s) + H (s)], U3(s) = rHR(s)   Hg(s), and
U2(s) =
( r)(y+rR g)
(+)[ r(1+(1+))]
h
(1 + )H(s)  (r + )H (s) + (1+)( r) H(s)
i
.17 The eigenval-
ues and eigenvectors of the Jacobian matrix are solved as follows:
1 = + ; 2;3 =
1
2
(

s
2 +
4(  r)
 (1 + )
[  r (1 +  (1 + ))]
)
;
v1 = (0; 1; 0)
0; v2 = (r   2; !2; 1)0; v3 = (r   3; !3; 1)0;
where !i = 1(+) i
h
( r)2
(1+) + (r   2) r++ (1 + )
i
, i = 2; 3. It is easy to know that 2 > 0,
3 < 0 by the assumption  r (1 +  (1 + )) > 0. By (20), the saddle-point stability condition
detJ =  4(+)( r)(1+) [  r (1 +  (1 + ))] < 0 holds. Since the Jacobian matrix J is nonsingular,
there exists an invertible matrix V = (v1; v2; v3) such that  = V  1JV , where
 =
0BB@
+  0 0
0 2 0
0 0 3
1CCA ; V  1 =
0BB@
!2 !3
2 3 1
!3(r 2) !2(r 3)
2 3
  12 3 0 r 32 3
1
2 3 0   r 22 3
1CCA :
Then,
(sI   )V  1
0BB@
C"(s)
M"(s)
B"(s)
1CCA = V  1
0BB@
U1(s) + c"(0)
U2(s) +m"(0)
U3(s)
1CCA :
17We dropped b"(0) in the tranformed matrix system because b is a state variable and the initial foreign asset
b0 cannot be changed immediately.
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Setting s = + ; 2 in the above matrix equation gives us two equations:
0 =
!2   !3
2   3 [U1(+ ) + c"(0)] + U2(+ ) +m"(0) +
!3(r   2)  !2(r   3)
2   3 U3(+ );
0 =   1
2   3 [U1(2) + c"(0)] + 0 +
r   3
2   3U3(2);
from which c"(0) and m"(0) can be derived
c"(0) = (r   3) [HR(2) Hg(2)]  (  r)
2 (y + rR  g)
 (1 + ) [  r (1 +  (1 + ))] [(1 + )H(2) + H (2)] ;
m"(0) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
 !2 !32 3 (r   3) [rHR(2) Hg(2)] + !2 !32 3
( r)2(y+rR g)
(1+)[ r(1+(1+))]
f(1 + ) [H(2) H(+ )] +  [H (2) H (+ )]g
  ( r)(1+)(y+rR g)(+)[ r(1+(1+))]H(+ )  ( r)(r+)(y+rR g)[ r(1+(1+))] H (+ )+
( r)2(1+)(y+rR g)
(+)[ r(1+(1+))]H(+ )  !3(r 2) !2(r 3)2 3 [rHR(+ ) Hg(+ )]
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
:
By substituting c"(0) and m"(0) into the system about


c";

m";

b"

, we have

b"(0) =  c"(0) + rhR(0)  hg(0):
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